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BOOK REVIEW
THE DEATH OF CONTRACT. By GRANT GILMORE. Columbus,
Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1974. Pp. 151. $8.00.
TIMOTHY J. SULLIVAN*
This is an important book. Professor Gilmore summarizes and extends
the legal analysis of a company of scholars who have argued for some
time that classical contract theory-as taught to generations of American
law students-no longer has much relevance to the reality of exchange
transactions in this country.' Professor Gilmore achieves, however,
more than simply the able restatement of existing scholarship; by supply-
ing an historical framework and a careful analysis of specific cases, he
makes his argument more persuasive for lawyers and law teachers of a
traditional turn of mind. Scholars who adhere to the "death of contract"
view frequently justify their theory by resort to empirical evidence of
business practice and commercial expectations. 2 They frequently mani-
fest a none too well-disguised contempt for what they might describe
as the abstract irrelevance of the typical appellate contract decision. Be-
cause Professor Gilmore is willing to trace the decline of classical con-
tract theory by fresh interpretation of the traditional cases, however,
his argument is more likely to reach the mainstream members of a pro-
fession trained to believe in the vital function of appellate decisions in
shaping the lawY
The classical contract law whose death Professor Gilmore's book
describes is classical only in a narrow sense. By classical contract
* A.B., College of William and Mary; J.D., Harvard University. Associate Dean and
Associate Professor of Law, College of William and Mary.
1. Professors Lawrence Friedman and Stewart Macaulay are two of the most prom-
inent members of the death of contract school. See Friedman & Macaulay, Contract
Law and Contract Teaching: Past, Present and Future, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 805.
2. See generally L. FRIEDMAV, CoTRrcr LAW iv AMERICA 198-202 (1965); Macaulay,
Non-Contractual Relations In Business, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963).
3. Fine examples of Professor Gilmore's new treatment of older cases may be found
at pages 49-53 (Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854)) and at pages
35-42 (Raffles v. Wickelhaus, 2 Hurl and C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864)). Pro-
fessor Gilmore's witty analysis of the issues and principles in Raffles alone justifies the
purchase of the book.
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theory, Professor Gilmore means the theory of general contract law
that he contends had its origin in the work of Dean Langdell, whose
casebook on contracts was first published in 1871. Professor Gilmore
describes Langdell as a man of limited scholarly imagination who became
infatuated with the notion that law was, in essence, a science and that
the careful application of scientific analysis to the raw materials of the
law would reveal the clear outlines of a logical, internally consistent
body of contract principles. Although Gilmore only grudgingly credits
Langdell, the undistinguished intellect, for stumbling across a heretofore
undiscovered general law of contract, Gilmore more generously identi-
fies Holmes and to a lesser extent, Villiston, as the greater minds who
seized upon a somewhat weak Langdellian idea and transformed it into
a robust body of rules that governed the minds of scholars and judges
for two generations.
Before discussing the content and function of classical contract theory,
it is important to note that Professor Gilmore believes that much of
classical contract learning was the product not of what the law was, but
rather of Langdell's imagination and of Holmes's view of what the law
should be.4 Langdell's "discovery" of a general contract theory and its
later elaboration by Holmes are traceable, according to Professor Gil-
more, to a combination of economic and social conditions in the late
19th century and to the philosophical bent of Justice Holmes, itself un-
doubtedly shaped by the economic and social theories then prevailing:
"[T] his [was] the law ... the Industrial Revolution left in its wake." 5
The Holmesian view represented "a deliberate relinquishment of the
temptation to restrict untrammeled individual autonomy or the com-
pletely free market in the name of social policy." 6 The essential aim
of classical contract theory, as interpreted by Holmes, was to restrict
the reach of contract liability within the narrowest possible compass;
the ideal was to create a legal scheme in which "no one should be liable
to anyone for anything." '
4. Holmes's great contribution to classical contract theory is found in the three
chapters (7-9) devoted to contract law in his brilliant work, The Connmon Law. It has
long been understood that The Connizon Law was as much an expression of Holmesian
philosophy as it was an explication of legal history. See Howe, Introduction to 0.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW at xx (1881, Howe ed. 1963).
5. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH oF CONTRACT 8 (1974).
6. L. FRIEDMAN, CoNTRACr LAW IN AMERMA 6-7 (1965).
7. G. GmMORE, supra note 5, at 14. Holmes argued that any rational legal system
must fully allow for the fundamental character of human nature. The Holmesian vision
of human nature was not romantic: "But it seems to me clear that the ultinia ratio,
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At the core of classical contract theory was the idea of consideration.
There was nothing new, of course, in the proposition that consideration
must exist as a condition for rendering a promise enforceable. Long be-
fore Langdell and Holmes began to fashion classical contract theory,
the concept of consideration occupied a central position in the firmament
of Anglo-American contract law. What was new was the Holmesian
definition of consideration. No longer would any benefit or detriment
suffice to support a finding of consideration; it was necessary, according
to Holmes, that the promisee show that the asserted consideration was
the product of bargain. A promisee might suffer real and substantial
detriment in the course of performing an agreement but absent that in-
dispensable element of bargain, no agreement made by the promisor
could be enforced judicially. As Holmes wrote: "[I]t is the essence
of a consideration, that, by the terms of the agreement, it is given and
accepted as the motive or inducement . for furnishing the considera-
tion. The root of the whole matter is the relation of reciprocal con-
ventional inducement, each for the other, between consideration and
promise." 8 According to Professor Gilmore, the Holmesian gloss on
the received doctrine of consideration was no mere restatement of exist-
ing law. It was, instead, a revolutionary redefinition of the term. The
revolution was successful, for Holmes's bargain theory of consideration,
though asserted "naked of ... authority," was adopted enthusiastically
by lawyers and judges of Holmes's own and later generations.' The
bargain theory of consideration is embodied today in section 75 of the
First Restatement of Contracts and remains substantially intact in the
tentative drafts of the Second Restatement. The effect of Holmes's suc-
cessful redefinition of consideration on the body of contract law is not
difficult to see. If only bargained-for consideration will suffice, the
range of cases in which contractual liability may be imposed is reduced
considerably. This narrowing of the boundaries of consideration well
served the fundamental purpose of Holmes and his intellectual adherents:
to insulate to the maximum possible extent individual action from the
sanctions of the law.
not only regum, but of private persons, is force, and that at the bottom of all private
relations, however tempered by sympathy and all the social feelings, is a justifiable
self-preference. If a man is on a plank in the deep sea which will only float one, and
a stranger lays hold of it, he will thrust him off if he can." 0. HOLMES, supra note 4,
at 38.
8. 0. HoLMEs, supra note 4, at 230.
9. G. GILMORE, supra note 5, at 21.
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Although new and more restrictive notions of consideration were
fundamental, there was much more to Holmes's elaboration of classical
contract theory. For example, Professor Gilmore notes that the classi-
cists aimed to keep contract damages low. In pursuing this objective,
Holmes and his adherents had the help of history and a substantial body
of decided cases. Modern courts routinely protect the "expectation in-
terest," 10 however, and lawyers take for granted the idea that the aim
of contract damages is to compensate the aggrieved party by putting
him in a "full performance" position. Professor Gilmore suggests that
the typical contract damage standard applicable in the first half of the
19th century did not protect the "expectation interest" and that only
after the celebrated decision of Hadley v. Baxendae"1 did the "expecta-
tion interest" begin to receive legal protection. In retrospect, the con-
ditions under which the court in Hadley suggested that it might sanction
a recovery of expectancy damages seem restrictive. Baron Alderson,
writing for the court, said that only when special circumstances were
communicated to the defendant-and these must be found to have been
within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting-would
the plaintiffs be entitled to recover expectancy damages. To Holmes
and his contemporaries of the late 19th century, the historical sig-
nificance of Hadley looked very different than it does to modern
lawyers. Professor Gilmore contends that in Holmes's view, the terms
on which Baron Alderson was prepared to hold the defendant liable
for lost profits were dangerously liberal. More must be shown, reasoned
Holmes, than the bare fact that the plaintiff may have brought to the
defendant's attention the existence of facts that upon breach, could re-
sult in more than ordinary injury. What Holmes insisted must be estab-
lished was a showing that the breaching party consciously and delib-
erately had assumed the special risks of loss that the aggrieved party
sought to recover. This strict construction of the holding in Hadley
became another weapon in the classicists' armory of rules and glosses on
rules designed to protect the individual actor from the potentially
powerful impact of legal sanction.
10. The term is Professor Fuller's and is drawn from the classic article, Fuller &
Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 373 (1937).11. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). Professor Gilmore's analysis of Hadley is
irreverent as well as original: "Since 1854 the starting point for all discussion of con-
tract damage theory has been Hadley v. Baxendale-although why such an essentially
uninteresting case, decided in a not very good opinion by a judge otherwise unknown
to fame, should immediately have become celebrated on both sides of the Atlantic is
one of the mysteries of legal history." G. GILMoR, supra note 5, at 49.
[Vol. 17:403
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The adherents of classical contract theory developed a comprehensive
scheme of contract doctrine. Holmes, for example, devoted much at-
tention to the law of mistake and excuse for nonperformance. Professor
Gilmore treats each of these subject areas in detail and with great learn-
ing. Enough has been written here to give the reader some sense of the
objectives and methods of Langdell, Holmes, and others who shared
their views.
The success of classical contract theory had at least one immediate
effect: it was fatal to the subjective school of contract analysis that had
enjoyed wide acceptance prior to the publication of The Com-
mon Law. The subjective approach placed great emphasis upon what
the parties to a purported contract actually intended; the crucial inquiry
was to determine whether there had been a "meeting of the minds."
This analysis was rejected by the classicists, who, though they did not
deny that the intention of the parties was crucial to ascertaining the
existence and extent of contractual liability, altered radically the means
by which the intent of the parties was assayed. For Holmes, any at-
tempt to gauge what the actual parties to a real transaction actually be-
lieved was irrelevant. Intention and meaning were to be assessed against
the hypothetical understanding of the reasonable man. Thus, the post-
Holmesian objectivists, typified by Williston, formed their analysis on
external factors.
The effect of objective analysis, according to Professor Gilmore, was
to transform into questions of law issues (such as actual intent) that
were questions of fact for the subjectivists. The repetition of fact pat-
terns, in objective analysis, yielded rules of law by which intent became
ascertainable. This emphasis on externals had one curious effect; it may
be recalled that the principal aim of the classicists was to restrict the field
of contract liability, but by their rejection of subjective analysis, the
Holmesians narrowed significantly the basis upon which a party might
be discharged for contractual liability on the grounds of mistake. The
objectivists would not permit a party seeking relief from contractual
liability to be heard to say, "I didn't really mean what I seemed to say."
What mattered was not what the contracting parties said they meant,
but what a reasonable man might think they meant. "Evidently," as
Professor Gilmore writes, "a free and easy approach to the problem of
contract formation goes hand-in-hand with a free and easy approach to
the problem of contract dissolution or excuse, and vice versa." 12
12. G. GILM0o, supra note 5, at 48 (emphasis supplied).
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The whole system of classical contract law was, in Holmes's phrase,
"formal and external"; the classicists' rules were logical, largely con-
sistent, and quite inflexible, and they were meant to be so. Holmes and
his brethren, Professor Gilmore tells us, had no intention of tempering
the wind to the shorn lamb. Under Holmesian analysis, for example, the
fact that a promisee had relied reasonably and substantially upon words
of promise was legally insignificant. If the promisee could not show
bargained-for consideration, he had no claim to legal relief against the
asserted promisor. This wintry logic might do for Holmes, but few
other judges before, or since, have possessed either Holmes's steely
spine or his steely intellect. Judges attempting to apply classical con-
tract theory kept colliding with the reality that conclusions required
by the logic of classical contract theory seemed unfair. Slowly and sur-
reptitiously at first, quickly and more explicitly later, the courts under-
took the demolition of classical contract theory.
It may be argued, as indeed Professor Gilmore does, that the classical
system of contract law was in decline almost from the date of its birth.
Despite appropriate invocations of the principal tenets of the faith, even
courts in the late 19th century occasionally ignored the strictures of
the Holmesian system in order to produce results that seemed sensible
under the circumstances. Such judicial heresies had little contemporary
impact, because, Professor Gilmore indicates, the scholars who wrote
the treatises and edited the casebooks chose not to incorporate in such
works cases that did injury to the orthodox structure of classical con-
tract thought. As Professor Gilmore suggests, it remained for scholars
closer to our own time-Professor Fuller notable among them-to re-
examine the fabric of late 19th and early 20th century law and to report
their conclusions that even in its infancy classical contract theory did
not occupy the field alone.
The decline of classical contract theory in all of its aspects is too
complicated to trace here; for our purposes it will suffice to concentrate
on the erosion of the concept of bargained-for consideration-that part
of the classical system described by Professor Gilmore as its "great
balance wheel." We are told by Professor Gilmore that the decline of
the idea of bargained-for consideration is linked closely to the rise of two
related, but distinct concepts: reliance and quasi-contract. If the result
of Holmes's addition of the requirement of bargain and of the concept
of consideration was to restrict the reach of contractual liability, the
[Vol. 17:403
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cumulative impact of the ideas of reliance and quasi-contract has been
to broaden greatly the range of legally enforceable promises.
Section 90 of the First Restatement of Contracts establishes the rele-
vance of reliance as a basis for enforcing promises. Professor Gilmore
describes in interesting detail how, through the insistence of Professor
Corbin, the draftsmen of the Restatement were persuaded to include
section 90 after they had adopted the Holmesian definition of bargained-
for consideration in section 75. Professor Gilmore aptly describes the
First Restatement as "schizophrenic." How otherwise is it possible to
explain a document that, on the one hand, requires bargained-for con-
sideration as a basis for enforcing promises and, on the other, asserts that
a promise that induces reliance of a substantial character is binding if
injustice cannot otherwise be avoided? The paradox of sections 75 and
90 cannot be explained rationally, for as Professor Gilmore observes:
"Perhaps what we have here is Restatement and anti-Restatement or
Contract and anti-Contract.... The one thing that is clear is that these
two contradictory propositions cannot live comfortably together: in
the end one must swallow the other up." '- It is quite certain which of
the two conflicting sections the draftsmen of the Restatement expected
to fade into obscurity; the belief was widespread that the concept of
reliance as articulated in section 90 would be confined to the back-
waters of noncommercial transactions and donative promises. The drafts-
men were not alone in their belief; it was shared by other influential
shapers of the law. Professor Gilmore quotes Judge Learned Hand
arguing for the limited relevance of reliance.14 Judge Hand and the
many legal luminaries who shared his views could not have been more
wrong. The expansion of reliance, since its explicit recognition in the
First Restatement, has been steady, even spectacular. In contrast, section
75, embodying the classical contract idea of bargained-for consideration,
has been cited rarely, if at all. Indeed, so great has been the appeal of
section 90, that Professor Gilmore has discovered some recent decisions,
rooted in notions of reliance, that impose liability without reference to
the law of contract at all.' 5
As Professor Gilmore observes, the growth of the concept of reliance
has eroded classical consideration theory on the detriment side. The idea
13. Id. at 61.
14. Id. at 66. Judge Hand's restrictive view of reliance is well illustrated by his
opinion in James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros. Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
15. Professor Gilmore cites N. Litterio & Co., Inc. v. Glassman Constr. Co., Inc.,
319 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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of unjust enrichment as expressed in the law of quasi-contract has had
a similar effect on the benefit side of the Holmesian concept of con-
sideration. 6 Professor Gilmore surely would concede that others before
him have noted the damage done to conventional notions of considera-
tion by the idea of unjust enrichment. Professor John Dawson, writing
25 years ago, noted:
Yet once the idea [of preventing unjust enrichment] has been
formulated as a generalization, it has the peculiar facility of in-
ducing quite sober citizens to jump right off the dock. This tem-
porary intoxication is seldom produced by other ideas, such as
"equity," "good faith," or "justice," for these ideals themselves sug-
gest their own relativity and the complexity of the factors that must
enter into judgment. The ideal of preventing enrichment through
another's loss has a strong appeal to the sense of equal justice but
it also has the delusive appearance of mathematical simplicity. It
suggests not merely the need for a remedy but a measure of re-
covery. It constantly tends to become a "rule," to dictate solutions,
to impose itself on the mind.' 7
Like reliance, the law of restitution has enjoyed steady growth at the
expense of classical contract theory. Unlike reliance, the expansion of
restitutionary remedies into areas previously governed solely by the law
of consideration has not been as much celebrated by scholars. Thus, the
impact of this easier access to restitutionary remedies as an alternative
to traditional contract relief has not been well understood. 8 The great
16. Quasi-contract is a term historically limited in its application to law actions for
the recovery of money. Modern usage has expanded the meaning of quasi-contract to
reach a wide range of restitutionary actions both at law and in equity. Although the
modern usage has been criticized as misleading and historically inaccurate, see Hender-
son, Promises Grounded in the Past: The Idea of Unjust Enriclnent and the Law of
Contracts, 57 VA. L. REv. 1115, 1135 n.88 (1971), it is the meaning most often attributed to
the term in the modern cases. See generally Comment, Restitution: Concepts and Terms,
19 HAST. L.J. 1167 (1968).
17. J. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 8 (1951).
18. The confusion surrounding the law of. quasi-contract is attributable to its tangled
historical origins and to its application as a supplement to conventional remedies in both
tort and contract actions. The more traditional view is that quasi-contract principles
constitute a body of law separate from either tort or contract and thus are uniformly
applicable to any relevant set of facts. In recent years, some scholars have argued that
quasi-contract actions based upon the existence of an express contract should be resolved
separately and more in accordance with conventional contract law. See Childres &
Garamella, The Law of Restitution and the Reliance Interest in Contract, 64 Nw. U.L.
REv. 433 (1969); Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Context, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1208
(1973). But cf. Dawson, Restitution or Danages?, 20 OHIo ST. L.J. 175, 189 (1959).
[Vol. 17:403
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stimulus to the growth of quasi-contract has been the inability of courts
to frame any common definition of benefit. In the absence of any clear
concept of benefit, courts so disposed have been free to make restitu-
tionary relief available to plaintiffs who would have no realistic chance
for recovery under standard contract theory.19 Confusion has permitted
a large measure of judicial discretion. The concepts that underlie the
doctrine of quasi-contract are fully as open ended as those that support
the idea of reliance; establishing what constitutes substantial reliance is
no less subjective than the search for what is sufficient benefit in the law
of quasi-contract. Together, reliance and restitution have provided al-
ternate but equally irresistible grounds for the judicial emasculation of
consideration as a significant legal concept.
Professor Gilmore does not confine his account of the decline of clas-
sical contract doctrine to describing the eclipse of consideration. He
acknowledges, for example, the importance of the Uniform Commercial
Code in hastening the decline of conventional ideas." This is not the
occasion to dwell at length on the details of Professor Gilmore's careful
analysis; it is enough for present purposes to state his conclusion that
classical contract law is effectively dead, that the carefully constructed
19th century obstacles to broadened liability have been swept aside, and
that the law of contract is being quickly reabsorbed into the body of
tort law from which it was artificially separated not much more than a
century ago.
This analysis of The Death of Contract has been lengthy. Perhaps
justification for the comprehensive exposition of Professor Gilmore's
ideas may be found in the special quality of his scholarship. We are all
too familiar with the work of scholars who write in deadening detail
about some forgotten (usually with good reason) backwater of the law.
As has been observed elsewhere, habitual readers of contemporary law
journals are learning more and more about less and less. It is no small
part of Professor Gilmore's achievement that The Death of Contract
can actually be read with pleasure. His aim has been not to overanalyze
some minute aspect of contract law, but to weigh the experience of
19. See generally Sullivan, The Concept of Benefit in the Law of Quasi-Contract, 64
GEo. LJ. 1 (1975).
20. The nearly universal adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code symbolizes the
failure of the Holmesian faith. Under Code theory the crucial inquiry is not to deter-
mine the existence of bargain in the Holmesian sense but rather whether there was an
intention to contract. See Speidel, Contract Law: Some Reflections Upon Conmercial
Context and the Judicial Process, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 822, 830.
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three generations of scholars, lawyers, and judges in order to offer ex-
planations, some tentative and some quite unequivocal, as to what the
modern law of contract has become and how it attained its present form.
One may dispute some of Professor Gilmore's particular assertions, 21
but the substance of his portrait of contemporary contract law is sound.
Some of what Professor Gilmore has revealed, however, has profoundly
disquieting implications. It may be true that those who labored in the
Holmesian faith of classical contract theory were too concerned with
logical symmetry and with analytic form. Yet we do a real disservice
to the great builders of classical contract theory-Holmes, him-
self, chief among them-if we dismiss their work as simply aca-
demic or unrealistic. Holmes's devotion to the rigors of legal analysis
was real but surely he was no cloistered intellectual incapable of con-
necting ideas with reality. He was no believer in the existence of uni-
versal truths that governed forever in the affairs of men.2 2 Quite to the
contrary, his skepticism was profound; he was a man of action as well
as a man of ideas. The Langdellian system he adapted and elaborated
did emphasize legal logic and analytical rigor. Its purpose, as Professor
Gilmore establishes, was to limit the scope of contractual liability as a
means of maximizing freedom; in this sense, the classical system was
quite practical and wholly in keeping with the unbridled entrepreneurial
spirit of the late 19th century. One may dispute the values of that time,
but the system of contract doctrine that Holmes activated was wholly
in concert with the spirit of his age. Holmes and the more thoughtful
classicists built their system upon the conviction that the law's function
must be modest. In no circumstances, they believed, should legal rules
unduly restrict the free play of the "self-preference" principle that, in
Holmes's view, was the governing principle of human conduct.2 3
21. Professor Gilmore's assertion that, historically, contract has been merely a de-
pendent offspring of tort is debatable. Professor Gilmore understates the significance of
the independent development of contract. The imperfections in Professor Gilmore's
historical analysis are documented exhaustively. in Gordley, Book Review, 89 HARv. L.
REv. 452 (1975). The cited book review is devoted almost exclusively to the revelation
of Professor Gilmore's historical errors. The validity of Professor Gilmore's thesis does
not depend, however, upon the accuracy of his excursions into early English or conti-
nental legal history.
22. Among the papers inserted between the pages of Holmes's own copy of The
Conmnon Law is this statement: "As Ibsen picturesquely puts it: 'Truths are by no
means the wiry Methuselahs some people think them. A normally constituted truth
lives-let us say-as a rule, seventeen or eighteen years; at the outside twenty; seldom
longer. And truths so stricken in years are always shockingly thin.'" Howe, Intro-
duction to 0. HOLMES, supra note 4, at xii n.3.
23. Id. at 38.
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The values of our time are fundamentally different from those of
Holmes's generation. Legal rules are assumed to have relevance to an
ever-widening circle of human relationships. This expansive tendency
of modern law is reflected, for example, in the growing range of trans-
actions to which constitutional due process standards are now appli-
cable.24 This "legalization" of modern life has had its effect upon con-
tract law as well; what we have seen is what Professor Gilmore
describes "as an explosion of liability." The classical rules of contract,
designed to restrict liability, have almost all been laid flat.
The full impact of the difference between the classical and modern
laws of contract cannot be grasped simply by noting that the analytical
constructs of the Holmesian system have largely been discarded; it is
equally important to understand the particular character of the doctrines
that have supplanted those that gave the classical system its special flavor.
The emphasis in modern contract law is upon concepts comparatively
lacking in distinguishable analytic content; subjective judgments and
judicial intuition are the order of the day. Professor Gilmore admirably
describes the flexible character of reliance and quasi-contract, two prin-
ciples that he believes have been chiefly responsible for the displacement
of classical theory. There have been other agents of change, however;
the doctrine of unconscionability now makes frequent appearances in the
reports; likewise, careful inquiries into the relative bargaining power of
the parties are quite common; even the economic and educational status
of parties to agreements sometimes explains the result in a particular
case.25 In this sprawling and subjective body of doctrine that dominates
the modern law of contract, the role of careful, traditional legal analysis
is limited. The articulation of discernible legal standards applicable to
even a narrow range of cases has become almost impossible in the new
jurisprudence of contracts. The judge's role is sometimes more that of
a sociologist than a legal craftsman, and the instruments of dispute resolu-
tion often are not those that belong peculiarly to law.
There is no intention here to condemn the impact of modern contract
law. Certainly the classical system-to the extent that it was ever strictly
applied in the cases-was inward looking and quite uninterested in de-
termining the real intent of real parties to a contract; moreover, the
judges who acted in the Holmesian tradition frequently seemed more
24. The striking growth of the law of procedural due process is ably traced in
Rendleman, The New Due Process: Rights and Remedies, 63 Ky. L.J. 532 (1975).
25. See Childres & Spitz, Status in the Law of Contract, 47 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1 (1972).
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concerned with the form than with the substance of a transaction. The
efforts of Professor Llewellyn and the realists have supplied a much
needed corrective to the excesses of the classical faith; by shifting the
emphasis of judicial analysis away from abstract rules toward the "real
law" that emerges from a careful study of the expectations and assump-
tions of the contracting parties,26 the realists truly rebelled against the
classical establishment. Rarely has the success of a revolution been more
complete; emphasis on commercial practices and the parties' actual as-
sumptiors has become the new orthodoxy of contract analysis, and
Holmesian doctrine has ceased to be a meaningful influence in the de-
velopment of contract law. What is ironic is that the classical system,
conceived as a means to insulate individual action from the consequences
of legal sanction, should be overthrown chiefly because its evolution had
made it an obstacle to effectuating what were perceived to be the legiti-
mate purposes of real transactions.
In describing the displacement of classical contract law, perhaps it is
not strictly accurate to speak of revolution. The process of change has
been gradual; the decline of the Holmesian system has been genteel.
Lawyers are usually not competent historians, and therefore, their use of
historical terminology is sometimes inept. Habitual emphasis on the
particular facts of a particular case tends to cloud long range focus, and
consequently incremental changes often are mistaken for major up-
heavals. Professor Richard Morris aptly described this phenomenon
when he wrote that in general lawyers "tend to view every inroad on
habit as a catastrophic revolution." 27 Yet it is true that the assumptions
of modern contract law vary significantly from the dominant values of
the classical system. Classical theory sought to secure maximum pro-
tection for freedom of individual action, but the thrust of modern con-
tract jurisprudence is to assure equality. This quest after equality is re-
flected only obliquely in the doctrines of reliance and quasi-contract,
which Professor Gilmore identifies as the distinguishing features of mod-
ern contract law. The concern for justice or equality in contemporary
contract cases is more apparent in the increasing prominence of doctrines
such as unconscionability and in the frequency with which courts, by
inquiring into the equality of bargaining power, seek to protect the
26. Professor Llewellyn's convictioh that "law" is to be found in the minds and con-
duct of men rather than in immutable rules of logic suffuses almost all his major
work. See, e.g., Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REv.
431 (1930).
27. R. Momis, SEVEN WHO SH A OUR DEsT-NY 86 (1973).
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weaker party from what is deemed unacceptable exploitation by the
stronger party. Such concerns likely would be disdained by a court
acting consistently with classical theory; even in classical contract law,
of course, exceptions were allowed for weaker parties in special circum-
stances, but the disposition to set aside a hard bargain was then a judicial
impulse much weaker than it is today.
The conflict between the older contract law, which valued freedom,
and the newer rules, which promote equality, has its analogue in other
fields. Indeed the origin of this tension may be traced to economics.
Arthur Okun, in The Political Economy of Prosperity, defines the cen-
tral dilemma of modern economics as the attempt to balance the need for
efficiency against the desire for equity:
A democratic capitalism must perform a perpetual juggling act to
keep the balance between equity and efficiency. In a society with
egalitarian principles, substantial inequality in income and wealth is
tolerated only as a concession to efficiency. The inequality arises
through the carrots and sticks of the market system. Sometimes the
carrots are awarded to the wise, the energetic, and the ingenious;
such results square with society's sense of fair play .... In many
instances, however, rewards and penalties are not neatly equated
with personal merit.28
The conflict between classical contract theory and the new law of con-
tract is very much a product of the clash between the Holmesian faith
in freedom (a faith that assumes the triumph of the strong) and the
contemporary conviction that the strong are not always just or deserv-
ing of reward. Thus, courts have used modern contract doctrine to
protect the weak against the strong with little regard for what are per-
ceived as antiquated and unrealistic notions of freedom. There may be
nothing wrong with such an approach to contract law, but informed
judgment is difficult. Rarely do courts attempt to assess the costs they
impose upon society by their well-intended efforts to promote equality
or, as Professor Okun would have it, justice. This seeming lack of con-
cern for economic efficiency is curious, as one of the most persuasive
arguments for the overthrow of the classical system was that it was too
preoccupied with narrow rules of law. Modern courts quite casually
make judgments rooted in sociological or philosophical concepts, and
there is no reason why they should not give equal attention to considera-
tions of economic efficiency.
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Fortunately, the academic branch of the legal profession is beginning
to discover the relationship between law and economics; owing much
to the pioneering work of Richard Posner,29 many scholars are attempt-
ing to assess the economic impact of legal rules in a variety of fields.3 0
The perspective of the economist should provide much needed insight
into the real import of the new contract learning, because the economist
is concerned with efficiency and with the most rational means of al-
locating scarce resources. Although considerations of economic efficien-
cy should not dominate judicial decisions in the field of contract law,
the economic perspective-considered in its proper place-might provide
a useful means of restoring concern for efficiency to a respected place
in the law of contract. The Holmesians, in their devotion to freedom
and their attachment to efficiency, may have carried a good thing too
far; the excesses of the modernists, however, with their implacable bias in
favor of equality, are also very real.
Professor Gilmore accurately and ably has recorded the death of
classical contract. In his closing paragraphs he hints at the possibility of
resurrection. Resurrection may not be the most appropriate description,
for it implies the restoration of an antique doctrine unaltered by experi-
ence. What seems more likely is a counterrevolution whose aim is the
creation of a law of contract sensitive to the need for justice but equally
cognizant of the legitimate claims of economic efficiency. Should such
a hybrid contract law appear, those among us who have argued the rele-
vance of economics to law will deserve to be remembered as the van-
guard of the revolutionary army.
29. The most notable work yet published in the field of law and economics is R.
POSNER, EcONoMic ANALYSIS oF LA% (1972).
30. The relevance of economic insights is much. broader than many may imagine.
For an original and unusually able treatment of economic issues in the area of consti-
tutional law, see Scott, Constitutional Regulation of Provisional Creditor Remedies: The
Cost of Procedural Due Process, 61 VA. L. REv. 807 (1975).
